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INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE1
The Domestic Violence Legal Empowerment
and Appeals Project (“DV LEAP”) is committed
to combatting domestic violence through litigation,
legislation, and policy initiatives. DV LEAP has extensive
experience working with survivors of domestic violence,
pursuing civil and criminal legal and policy reform efforts
on their behalf, and filing amicus curiae and party briefs
in appellate courts and in this Court.
AEquitas: The Prosecutors’ Resource on Violence
Against Women (“AEquitas”) provides training, research
assistance, and resources to improve the investigation and
prosecution of crimes of violence against women.
Futures Without Violence (“FUTURES”) provides
groundbreaking programs, policies, and campaigns to
empower individuals and organizations working to end
violence against women and children around the world.
FUTURES was a driving force behind the passage of the
Violence Against Women Act of 1994.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Amici, three nationally recognized organizations
providing advocacy and training, and promoting reform of
the criminal and civil law pertaining to domestic violence,
1. The parties have consented to the filing of this brief. No
counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no
such counsel or party made a monetary contribution intended to fund
the preparation or submission of this brief. No person other than
amici curiae or their counsel made a monetary contribution to its
preparation or submission.

2
are gravely concerned about the devastating impact
Petitioners’ position would have on the safety of victims of
domestic abuse. Petitioners’ proposed result would deeply
erode the protections of the 1996 amendments to the
federal Gun Control Act (the “Lautenberg Amendment”),
by allowing many convicted batterers to possess firearms.
Amici seek to make clear that (1) Petitioners’ arguments
as to the meaning of the Lautenberg Amendment are
incorrect; (2) Petitioners’ position would devastate state
and federal efforts to keep guns out of the hands of batterers
due to the practical realities of state prosecutions; and (3)
Petitioners’ argument that this Court should narrow the
scope of the firearms prohibition because too many minor
domestic abuse cases are prosecuted now, completely
misstates reality.
First, Petitioners’ depiction of how battery 2 has
been prosecuted over time is distorted. The common
law treatment of battery varied across states and
unquestionably includes support for a recklessness mens
rea. Moreover, both the unsettled nature of the common
law’s treatment of the mens rea for battery, and this
Court’s decisions in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575
(1990), and Castleman v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1405
(2014), make clear that the common law, while an important
starting place, cannot be an outer limit on the meaning
of the statute’s definition of a “misdemeanor crime of
domestic violence” (“MCDV”) in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).
Rather, the legislative history indicates that MCDVs
were intended to include convictions under contemporary
2. As noted by the Government, “assault” and “battery” are
often “used interchangeably” in criminal law. Brief for the United
States (“Gov. Br.”) at 14 n. 2. Amici will do the same.

3
statutes and that reckless crimes were very much on the
sponsors’ minds.
Second, the practicalities of state misdemeanor
prosecutions mean that the result Petitioners seek would
render the Lautenberg Amendment protections largely
meaningless in the numerous jurisdictions with “divisible”
statutes, which permit conviction under more than one
mens rea level, because such adjudications rarely produce
documentation of the specific mens rea for the conviction.
As a result, excluding recklessness from the MCDV
definition would mean that convicted domestic violence
misdemeanants in a substantial number of states would
still have access to firearms, despite the Lautenberg
Amendment.
Third, contrary to Petitioners’ contention, reckless
domestic batteries are neither “minor” nor “accidental,”
and removal of firearms from such perpetrators is not
“unjust,” but a matter of common sense. Reckless battery
involves “conscious disregard” of the risk of harm, and
in the domestic violence context, is only a small piece of
a larger pattern of highly intentional coercive control.
Moreover, many incidents that may appear “minor” in
a vacuum are often immediately followed by homicide.
Guns provide abusers with an effective tool for terrorizing
victims and significantly increase the likelihood of fatal
violence.
Finally, there is no factual basis to support Petitioners’
claim that too many misdemeanor offenses are “swept”
into a criminal justice system that has eliminated
discretion in arrests and prosecution. Even today, only a
tiny percentage of all domestic violence crimes that occur

4
result in conviction. Accordingly, this Court should reject
Petitioners’ efforts to keep guns in the hands of convicted
domestic abusers and should hold that the Lautenberg
Amendment’s definition of an MCDV includes convictions
for reckless domestic battery.
ARGUMENT
I.

W H I L E T H E C O M M O N L AW I S N O T
CON TROLLING, IT A LSO SU PPORTS
INTERPRETING THE WORD “USE” IN THE
PHRASE “USE OF PHYSICAL FORCE” TO
INCLUDE A RECKLESSNESS MENS REA.

Relying on Castleman, Petitioners argue that
Congress intended to incorporate “the common-law
definition of battery” when adopting the phrase “use of
physical force” in the definition of an MCDV and that the
common law precluded battery based on recklessness
as a mens rea. Brief for Petitioners (“Pet. Br.”) at 13-17.
However, Petitioners overstate the role of the common
law in construing Section 922(g)(9), and they misstate the
common law view of the mens rea for battery.
A.

The Common Law Provides a Floor, but not a
Ceiling in Defining a Misdemeanor Crime of
Domestic Violence.

The Lautenberg A mendment bars individuals
convicted of an MCDV from possessing firearms. An
MCDV is defined, in pertinent part, as a “misdemeanor
under Federal, State, or Tribal law” that “has, as an
element, the use or attempted use of physical force…” 18
U.S.C. § 921(33)(A)(i-ii). In Castleman, this Court

5
consulted the common law to answer the question of
whether an “offensive touching” battery could be classified
as a “use of physical force,” despite the fact that relatively
little “force” was required for the crime. Castleman, 134
S. Ct. at 1410. Concluding that, as a historical matter,
the common law’s “misdemeanor-specific meaning of
‘force’” for the actus reus of battery is “satisfied by even
the slightest offensive touching,” the Court held that an
MCDV does indeed include an offensive touching battery.
Id. at 1410, 1413.
In Castleman, the common law was used to support
an application of the Lautenberg Amendment to a
purportedly minor battery of offensive touching, not to
limit its application. The Court stated that Congress
“incorporated” the common law — a non-exclusive
term suggesting the common law was “included” in the
definition, but not implying - and certainly not holding that if the common law fails to answer the question, or if
modern state statutes and case law differ from earlier
common law, contemporary usages of “misdemeanor” or
“use of physical force” would necessarily be excluded from
the definition of MCDVs. See id. at 1410.
Indeed, this Court has “declined to follow any rule that
a statutory term is to be given its common-law meaning,
when that meaning is obsolete or inconsistent with the
statute’s purpose.” Taylor, 495 U.S. at 594-95. Here,
limiting the statute as Petitioners propose would fly in the
face of Congressional intent and the plain language of the
statute, which expresses, without doubt, Congressional
intent to treat misdemeanor convictions under state,
Tribal, or federal law as the predicate offenses for the
federal firearm prohibition.

6
In fact, the remarks of sponsors and other senators
when the Lautenberg Amendment was enacted signaled
concern about reckless abusive behavior that could cause
death or grievous injury when guns are available. See,
e.g., 142 Cong. Rec. S11872-01 (Sept. 30, 1996) (statement
of Sen. Lautenberg) (describing the law’s application
to scenarios in which domestic arguments “get out of
control,” “the anger will get physical” and one partner
will commit assault “almost without knowing what he is
doing”); 142 Cong. Rec. S10379 (Sept. 12, 1996) (statement
of Sen. Feinstein) (describing concern that guns “might
do . . . harm” when domestic “violence get[s] out of hand,”
“result[ing] in tragedy”). As these remarks illustrate,
Congress was concerned not only with intentional injuries,
but also with volatile situations that could spiral out of
control. See also United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415,
426-27 (2009) (the “manifest purpose” of § 922(g)(9)
was to remedy the “potentially deadly combination” of
“[f]irearms and domestic strife”).
Congressional intent with regard to the term “use
of physical force” is also clear: As Senator Lautenberg
explained, that phrase was inserted in order to ensure
that purely property-related crimes, such as “cutting up
a credit card with a pair of scissors,” would be excluded
from the definition of MCDV. 142 Cong. Rec. S11872-01.
No reference was made to the common law meaning of
the phrase “use of physical force.” Id.
Indeed, Senator Lautenberg spoke at length about
the importance of identifying predicate offenses that fit
the MCDV definition, without once mentioning mens rea:

7
[C]onvictions for domestic violence-related
crimes often are for crimes, such as assault,
that are not explicitly identified as related to
domestic violence. Therefore, it will not always
be possible for law enforcement authorities to
determine from the face of someone’s criminal
record whether a particular misdemeanor
conviction involves domestic violence, as
defined in the new law . . . I would strongly urge
law enforcement authorities to thoroughly
investigate misdemeanor convictions on an
applicant’s criminal record to ensure that none
involves domestic violence, before allowing the
sale of a handgun. After all, for many battered
women and abused children, whether their
abuser gets access to a gun will be nothing
short of a matter of life and death.
142 Cong. Rec. S11872-01, (Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of
Sen. Lautenberg) (emphasis added). Despite this in-depth
focus on how conviction records would need to be explained
to identify MCDVs, neither Senator Lautenberg, nor
anyone else offering remarks about the amendment,
expressed any concern about identifying the mens rea of
a predicate offense; it is therefore apparent that excluding
state convictions for reckless acts was neither considered
nor intended.
Thus, the most one can say about the role of the
common law in interpreting the definition of an MCDV
and the term “use of physical force,” is that the common
law provides a floor, but not a ceiling or limit on the crimes
included as predicate offenses. Neither Castleman, the
language of the statute, nor anything in the legislative

8
history suggests that Congress sought to limit the scope
of application of the Lautenberg Amendment to only those
crimes that were recognized at common law.
B. The Common Law is Diverse, but Supports a
Mens Rea of Recklessness for Battery.
To whatever extent the common law informs the
interpretation of “use of physical force,” it provides
support for including reckless crimes, although it is far
from uniform.
Petitioners assert that there is a well-settled commonlaw definition of battery that “makes clear that the
crime could be committed only with the mental state of
intentional or knowing conduct.” Pet. Br. at 15. However,
Petitioners acknowledge that “Blackstone described
battery as ‘[t]he least touching of another’s person
willfully, or in anger.’” Pet. Br. at 15-16 (quoting 3 William
Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 120
(1768)). Blackstone’s distinction between “willfulness” and
“anger” could not be a clearer indication that something
less than purpose or knowledge was contemplated. Indeed,
the reference to “anger” captures the classic reckless
crime, in which the perpetrator is enraged, and behaves
recklessly in a manner which is dangerous, but not with
a specific intent to harm. See, e.g., statements of Sens.
Lautenberg and Feinstein, supra at 7. See also Gov. Br.
at 16-22 (citing multiple early sources).
Moreover, here is what members of Congress would
have found if they had looked to neighboring states to
investigate whether there was a “common law definition
of battery” (Pet. Br. at 13) before enacting § 922(g)(9):
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If Congress had looked nearby to Maryland, the
common law of Maryland defines battery to include
offensive physical contact that is the result of a reckless
act. See Nicolas v. State, 44 A.3d 396, 406-07 (Md. 2012)
(noting that statute codified the common law meaning,
which included offensive physical contact that was the
result of an intentional or reckless act of the defendant).
If Congress looked across the Potomac to Virginia,
the common law of Virginia defines battery to include
conduct “which showed a reckless and wanton disregard
for human life and safety.” See Davis v. Commonwealth,
143 S.E. 641, 643 (Va. 1928). Virginia courts also capture
the Blackstone formulation, holding that a battery includes
any touching “in rudeness or in anger” or “willfully or in
anger.” See Lynch v. Commonwealth, 109 S.E. 427, 428
(Va. 1921). 3
Petitioners, in identifying some examples in which
common-law battery required more than recklessness,
have at most shown that the common law is varied. Pet.
Br. at 15-16. But Congress could not have intended to
incorporate “the well-settled” or “widely accepted”
common-law definition of battery, if there is not one
well-settled or widely accepted common-law definition.
See Sekhar v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2720, 2724 (2013)
(“Congress intends to incorporate the well-settled meaning
of the common-law terms it uses”) (emphasis added)
(citation omitted); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S.
3. See also Vines v. United States, 70 A.3d 1170, 1180 (D.C. Ct.
App. 2013)(allowing “a finder of fact to infer the general intent to
commit a crime from reckless conduct” and applying that to statutory
“simple assault”).
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246, 263 (1952) (allowing courts to presume that Congress
knows of and adopts “widely accepted definitions” of
terms of art that it uses, absent contrary direction). In the
absence of a uniform common law definition, therefore, the
plain meaning statutory interpretation of the Lautenberg
Amendment would include any MCDV under which a
defendant was convicted, with whatever mens rea the
applicable federal, state, or Tribal statute required.
II. EXCLUDING RECKLESSNESS FROM THE
DEFINITION OF AN MCDV WOULD RENDER
THE LAUTENBERG AMENDMENT LARGELY
INEFFECTUAL IN MANY STATES DUE TO
THE PRACTICALITIES OF MISDEMEANOR
ADJUDICATIONS.
Amici agree with the Government’s assertion that,
if reckless crimes are excluded from the definition of
an MCDV, the Lautenberg Amendment would become a
“dead letter” in a majority of states under an elementsbased “categorical approach” to determining whether a
predicate offense qualifies as an MCDV. Hayes, 555 U.S.
at 427 (rejecting an interpretation under which § 922(g)(9)
would have been a “dead letter”); Gov. Br. at 38-40. Amici
explain herein that, due to the realities of misdemeanor
prosecution, even if this Court’s modified categorical
approach is applied to states with “divisible” statutes 4
that theoretically permit courts to identify the mens rea
under which a defendant was convicted, the result will be
no different.
4. Amici join the United States in recognizing that the
definition of a “divisible” statute is currently in contention. Gov. Br.
at 44.
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A.

The Application of the Modified Categorical
Approach to State Assault and Batter y
Convictions

This Court has required a purely elements-based
approach to determining whether a state conviction
constitutes a predicate offense for a federal statutory
crime. Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 228182 (2013). Where, however, statutes contain alternative
elements by which an offense can be proven, some
combinations of which will qualify as a predicate offense
and others that will not (i.e., “divisible” statutes), courts
are permitted to look to the record to determine which
elements formed the basis for conviction in a given case. See
Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602; Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S.
13, 19-21 (2005); Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2281-82 (2013)
(recognizing the “modified categorical approach”). Under
this “modified categorical approach,” it is permissible to
examine certain reliable “approved documents,” such as
the charging instrument, plea agreement forms, the plea
colloquy, jury instructions, or judgment of conviction to
determine exactly which elements formed the basis for
the defendant’s conviction. Shepard, 544 U.S. at 25-26;
Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2283-85.
As this Court has repeatedly observed, “perpetrators
of domestic violence are ‘routinely prosecuted under
generally applicable assault or battery laws.’” Castleman,
134 S.Ct. at 1411 (quoting Hayes, 555 U.S. at 427). As
shown in Appendices B and C of the Government’s Brief,
at least 16 states have assault or battery statutes that
list (in the same subsection) more than one mens rea
level including recklessness, any of which will suffice for
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conviction if bodily injury results. 5 These statutes are,
in principle, “divisible” under the Descamps framework,
and theoretically permit a review of reliable “approved
documents.” Shepard, 544 U.S. at 20-21. Nevertheless,
the manner in which such crimes are adjudicated—
whether by guilty plea or by trial—only rarely generates
documentation sufficient to identify the basis for the
conviction. Where the mens rea cannot be determined, the
conviction must be presumed to have been based on the
lowest level of culpability (i.e., recklessness). See Johnson
v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 137 (2010). Thus, however
purposeful/intentional or knowing the offender’s conduct
may actually have been, the absence of a reliable means
to ascertain the basis for a domestic violence conviction
means the convicted offender will not be prohibited from
obtaining a firearm, if convictions based on recklessness do
not qualify as MCDVs. Several factors in the adjudication
process contribute to this result.6
1.

Charging

If a misdemeanor crime is the only offense charged, the
charging document is likely to simply track the language
of the statute. A charge for simple assault is likely to allege
5. These jurisdictions include Arizona; Colorado; Delaware;
Hawaii; Kansas; Kentucky; Maine; Mississippi; Nebraska; New
Jersey; Oregon; Pennsylvania; Tennessee; Texas; Vermont; Wyoming.
See Gov. Br. at App. B and C.
6. Much of the information incorporated in Section II of this
brief is based on the experience and insights of Attorney Advisor
Teresa Garvey of amicus AEquitas, who prosecuted thousands
of domestic violence crimes, the vast majority of which involved
assaults, over a 22-year career as an Assistant Prosecutor in Camden
County, New Jersey.
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that on a particular date and time, in a specific place, the
defendant “purposely, knowingly, or recklessly” inflicted
bodily injury on the victim. By charging all of the possible
alternatives, the prosecutor increases the likelihood that
at least the minimum requisite culpability can be proven.
The prosecutor has nothing to gain by charging that a
defendant acted purposely if reckless conduct will suffice
for a conviction. Thus, the charging document itself is
unlikely, in most cases, to shed any light on the culpability
element for which the defendant was convicted.
2.

Guilty pleas

Tens of thousands of crimes of domestic violence—
both felonies and misdemeanors—are prosecuted in the
United States every year.7 The vast majority of domestic
violence crimes, like other crimes, are disposed of without
trial—most often by plea agreement. 8
A vast range of options is available to prosecutors
and defense attorneys in the plea bargaining context
7. While exact statistics for domestic violence prosecution are
not available, a 2000 study of arrests in 18 states and the District of
Columbia indicates there were in that year 82,056 arrests for crimes
of violence, including aggravated and simple assault, in which the
offender/victim relationship was spouse, parent, or son/daughter.
Matthew R. Durose, et al., Family Violence Statistics, U.S. DOJ,
Bureau of Just. Stat. 1, 41 (2005), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/
pdf/fvs.pdf.
8. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S.Ct. 1399 (2012) (noting that 94%
of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas). Other possible
dispositions include dismissal of charges for unprovable cases or, in
some instances, a deferred disposition or referral to a diversionary
program.
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for assaultive crimes. In addition to negotiating a
recommended sentence or other disposition within the
available statutory range, typically a number of different
criminal charges could potentially apply to a given set
of facts, each with its own range of potential sentences.9
When a plea offer for a felony or misdemeanor
offense is extended, the prosecutor in a jurisdiction with
multiple culpability elements generally has no reason to
be concerned with the defendant’s state of mind at the
time of the offense, so long as the minimum culpability
is admitted. The recommended sentence within the
statutory range has probably already been agreed upon;
moreover, even in the case of an “open” plea with no
specific sentencing recommendation, the prosecutor is
unlikely to insist upon a plea to a crime committed with a
specific state of mind. There is usually no real or perceived
benefit in doing so. The sentencing range is the same; the
defendant’s future criminal record will reflect a conviction
for the same offense regardless of the defendant’s state of
mind. Thus, any plea agreement documents are unlikely
to specify a particular culpability level.

9. Under the Model Penal Code (“MPC”), for example,
depending upon the quantum of bodily injury risked or inflicted,
the defendant’s state of mind, and whether or not a deadly weapon
was used, assault can range from a petty misdemeanor (MPC
§ 250.4(4), harassment by offensive touching), to a misdemeanor
(MPC § 211.1(1), simple assault), to a third-degree felony (MPC
§ 211.1(2)(b), aggravated assault with a deadly weapon), to a seconddegree felony (MPC § 211.1(2)(a), aggravated assault by attempting
to cause or causing serious bodily injury) – with associated sentences
ranging from a handful of days to up to ten years. MPC §§ 6.08,
6.06(3), 6.06(2).
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The plea colloquy is unlikely to be of any assistance,
either, in determining what crime a defendant has admitted
in his guilty plea, assuming that a transcript of the
colloquy exists. Defendants are, understandably, likely to
minimize their actions as the product of reckless behavior
rather than admitting purposeful or knowing infliction of
injury—provided the statute allows it. By permitting the
defendant to “save face” in this manner, the prosecutor
may be more likely to secure a satisfactory guilty plea to
the misdemeanor offense, and many defendants will take
advantage of the opportunity to minimize their conduct to
the extent possible, consistent with their plea agreement.
The trial judge accepting a guilty plea typically has no
reason to be concerned about whether a defendant admits
purposely, knowingly, or recklessly inflicting injury,
especially in the context of a simple assault or battery,
where the range of punishment is usually limited. So long
as the defendant admits guilt of the offense and at least
the minimum required culpability, the judge is likely to
accept the guilty plea, and the judgment of conviction will
simply indicate the crime of conviction without specifying
a particular level of culpability.
Whatever the evidence might have shown in terms
of the defendant’s intent to commit the crime, when a
defendant pleads guilty to a simple assault or battery
in any of the states with alternative levels of culpability,
neither the charging document, nor the plea agreement
documents, nor the plea colloquy, nor the judgment
of conviction is likely to reflect anything more than
recklessness.
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3.

Conviction after trial

Even in the trial context, regardless of whether
the defendant is tried only for the misdemeanor offense
or tried for a more serious felony but convicted of a
misdemeanor as a lesser-included offense,10 the same
kinds of considerations will impact the availability of
documents sufficient to determine the judge’s or jury’s
findings with regard to the defendant’s state of mind.
There is seldom any reason for prosecutors, judges,
defendants, or defense attorneys to be concerned about
the nice distinctions between various levels of culpability
that result in conviction for the same offense with the
same range of available sentences; that lack of concern
will be reflected in documents devoid of any indication of
the culpability for the crime of which the defendant was
convicted.
First, jury instructions for a simple assault or
battery crime with alternative culpability elements will
usually encompass all of the possible alternatives and are
therefore unlikely to reveal whether reckless conduct, or
something more, was the basis for the jury’s verdict.

10. Even when cases are prosecuted as felonies and taken to
trial, misdemeanor offenses are often lesser-included crimes that the
fact-finder must consider if the defendant is found not guilty of the
charged greater offense. If, for example, there is reasonable doubt
as to whether a victim’s injury qualifies as “serious bodily injury,”
the fact-finder may be called upon to consider whether the defendant
purposely, knowingly, or recklessly caused a lesser degree of bodily
injury and should, therefore, be found guilty of simple assault rather
than aggravated assault.
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Second, proof problems that are common in domestic
violence cases increase the likelihood of the jury returning
a verdict of guilt on a lesser-included misdemeanor
offense even where the defendant is being tried for a
felony assault. Often the only eyewitness to a domestic
violence assault is the victim, who may be reluctant to
participate, fail to appear in response to subpoena, recant
a prior statement, minimize the defendant’s conduct, or
even testify on behalf of the defendant. 11 In such cases,
there is an increased likelihood that a guilty verdict (if
one is returned) will be to a lesser-included offense, such
as a simple assault.
Third, in bench trials, a judge rendering a verdict
may issue findings of fact as part of that verdict, and
those findings might reveal the judge’s findings as to the
defendant’s culpability. However, it is likely that such
findings will extend only to the minimum culpability
necessary to support a finding of guilt, since that is the
only finding the judge would be required to make for
purposes of rendering the verdict.
Even under the modified categorical approach,
therefore, the record is highly unlikely to disclose a basis
for conviction greater than recklessness. If recklessness is
excluded from the MCDV definition, the vast majority of
convicted defendants in these jurisdictions would still be
free to possess a firearm. This result would eviscerate the
11. Victims of domestic violence are far more likely to avoid
participating in criminal trials or to recant their accusations than
any other crime victims. Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After
Crawford, 91 Va . L. R. 747, 768 (2005). It is estimated that victims of
domestic battery recant or refuse to participate in the prosecution
approximately 80-90% of the time. Id.
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protection Congress intended to afford victims of domestic
violence when it enacted the Lautenberg Amendment.
III. RECKLESSNESS IS BOTH SERIOUS AND
DANGEROUS, PARTICULARLY WHEN GUNS
A N D/OR DOMESTIC V IOLENCE A RE
INVOLVED.
A substantial portion of Petitioners’ brief is devoted
to suggesting that misdemeanor convictions for reckless
conduct, particularly in the domestic violence context,
penalize conduct that is only “accidental,” “minor,” and
that often involves “minor harms or no harm at all.”
Pet. Br. at 21, 25, 32. Petitioners therefore argue that
“a lifetime ban on firearm possession based on reckless
conduct presents an insufficient connection between the
target concern, protecting victims of domestic violence,
and the remedy, disarming perpetrators of domestic
violence.’” Id. at 34. To the contrary, copious evidence
supports Congress’s judgment that those who act with
conscious disregard of the risk of injury to their domestic
partners should not possess guns.
A.

Recklessness is Widely and Authoritatively
Recognized as Criminally Blameworthy and
Dangerous Conduct.

Petit ioners m ischa ract er i ze reck lessness as
“accidental” conduct, and suggest that, particularly when
linked to offensive touching, such non-intentional offenses
do not warrant removing a perpetrator’s firearms. Id.
at 21, 34. Their characterization of both recklessness
and reckless offensive contact, however, ignores the
well-settled acceptance of recklessness as a culpability
standard, and erroneously suggests a legally relevant
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difference between reckless battery convictions arising
from offensive contact or causing injury.
Reckless conduct is far more than an accident, and
in some settings – such as those involving firearms – is
extremely dangerous. Both Maine’s criminal statute and
the Model Penal Code define recklessness as requiring
that a person “consciously disregards” a risk that person’s
conduct will cause an unjustified result. Me. Rev. Stat.
17-A § 35(3)(A) and (C).12 See MPC § 2.02(2)(c) (“A person
acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an
offense when he consciously disregards a substantial
and unjustifiable risk . . .”). Reckless battery, therefore,
necessarily entails much more than carelessness or
“accident”: the perpetrator knows that his conduct
imposes a substantial risk of unacceptable harm to the
victim, yet consciously chooses to disregard that risk and
intentionally engages in that conduct anyway.
That recklessness is a serious and credible basis for
criminal culpability is underlined by the fact that the
Model Penal Code, produced by the leading criminal law
experts in the country after extensive deliberations,13
specifically assigns recklessness as the minimum default
12. “A person acts recklessly with respect to a result of the
person’s conduct when the person consciously disregards a risk that
the person’s conduct will cause such a result . . . the disregard of the
risk . . . must involve a gross deviation from the standard of conduct
that a reasonable and prudent person would observe in the same
situation.” Me. Rev. Stat. 17-A § 35(3)(A) and (C).
13. See Project Life Cycle, https://www.ali.org/projects/
project-life-cycle (last visited Jan. 21) (describing the “diverse group
of practitioners, judges, and scholars” who are “selected for their
particular knowledge and experience of the subject” who develop the
American Law Institute’s projects, including the Model Penal Code).
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mens rea for offenses with no specified intent requirement.
MPC § 2.02(3).14 The MPC is considered a highly influential
articulation of standards of criminal culpability.15 Given
the purpose of the Lautenberg Amendment – to keep
guns out of the hands of domestic abusers – it is unlikely
that Congress would have sought to be more restrictive
than the MPC. See Remarks of Sens. Feinstein and
Lautenberg, supra at 7.
Moreover, there can be no doubt that reckless conduct,
particularly with guns, is extremely dangerous. For
example, one caller to the National Domestic Violence
Hotline reported “My abuser has played Russian Roulette
with me before and has pulled the trigger.” Other callers
have reported that their abusers have fired a gun in the
14. While this Court in Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001
(2015), declined to reach the question of whether the Court should
likewise read recklessness into a federal threat statute, Justice
Alito’s concurrence made a strong case for it: “[W]hen Congress
does not specify a mens rea in a criminal statute, we have no
justification for inferring that anything more than recklessness is
needed . . . There can be no real dispute that recklessness regarding
a risk of serious harm is wrongful conduct.” Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at
2015 (Alito, J).
15. Richard G. Singer, Foreward, 19 Rutgers L. J. 519-20
(1988) (“celebrat[ing] and reflect[ing] upon one of the most historic
documents in the history of the criminal law . . . the crowning
achievement of the Code [is that] it has brought unity and cogency to
the chaos of the common law and its development in this country.”);
Joshua Dressler, Ref lections on Excusing Wrongdoers: Moral
Theory, New Excuses and the Model Penal Code, 19 Rutgers L.
Rev. 671 (1988) (echoing Herbert Packer’s “accolades for the Code”
because it “‘restored intellectual respectability to the substantive
criminal law . . .’”).
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house, held it up to them while arguing, and worse.16 See
Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1408-09 (noting that the presence
of a gun in a home significantly increases the probability
of death in incidents of domestic violence), citing Jacquelyn
C. Campbell, et al., Assessing Risk Factors for Intimate
Partner Homicide, 250 Nat. Inst of Just. J. 16 (2003)
(“When a gun was in the house, an abused woman was 6
times more likely than other abused women to be killed”).17
In addition, Petitioners misleadingly suggest
that offensive contact, when committed recklessly, is
somehow more minor or less a concern with regard to
gun possession than reckless battery that causes injury.18
16. “The children’s father has held up the gun to my head in
front of my two girl [sic] and unlocked the safety . . . When I tried
to break up with him he turned the gun away from me and shot it.
And the craziest thing is he was a convicted felon in [Text Removed]
and they handed him his gun license right back.” These examples
come from survey data and call summaries compiled by the National
Domestic Violence Hotline and provided by electronic mail to amicus
DV LEAP on 1/20/2016.
17. According to the Centers for Disease Control, more female
intimate partners are killed by firearms than by all other means
combined. Andrew R. Klein, Practical Implications of Current
Domestic Violence Research, Part II: Prosecution, U.S. DOJ Report
36 (2008), citing Leonard J. Paulkossi, Surveillance for Homicide
among Intimate Partners-United States, 1991-1998, Morbidity and
Mortality Weekly Surveillance Summaries 5, 1-16 (2001).
18. The question on which this Court granted certiorari
was stated in the Petition for Certiorari as “Does a misdemeanor
crime with the mens rea of recklessness qualify as a ‘misdemeanor
crime of domestic violence’ as defined by 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(33)(A)
and 922(g)(9)?” Pet. Br. at (i). Petitioners’ merits brief appears to
narrow that question. Pet. Br. at 1-2 (“[t]his case presents a narrow
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The distinction has no salience, however, in this context.
The very nature of reckless battery entails conscious
disregard by the perpetrator of the risk to the victim.
Reckless batteries resulting in serious injury are often
distinguished from reckless offensive touching solely
by happenstance – nothing else. To build on the First
Circuit’s example, recklessly throwing a knife towards a
battered spouse could result in a deep gash or could just
graze the victim without causing injury. United States
v. Voisine, 778 F.3d 176, 185 (1st Cir. 2015). Whether the
conduct injures or offends, and the severity of any injury,
are purely a matter of chance, beyond the abuser’s control.
In these circumstances, as a legal matter, the abuser’s
conduct and culpability for consciously placing the victim
at risk of harm is identical regardless of the ultimate
degree of harm. As this Court held in Castleman, the
Lautenberg Amendment’s definition of misdemeanor
crimes of domestic violence encompasses both violent
“severe domestic abuse” and domestic battery that
involves offensive contact. 134 S. Ct. at 1413, 1415. There
is neither a legal nor public policy basis to distinguish
between the two for purposes of the mens rea question
before the Court.

question of statutory interpretation: Whether the ‘use or attempted
use of physical force’ under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A) extends to
merely reckless (as opposed to intentional) offensive physical
contact”) (emphasis added). As described in this Section, however,
the distinction Petitioners attempt to draw is legally irrelevant and
misleading.
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B. Even Reckless and Seemingly Minor Domestic
Violence Crimes are Often Linked to an
Abuser’s Intentional Coercive Control Over the
Victim and to Serious Risk of Lethal Harm.
1.

Reckless batteries are part of an intentional
course of conduct.

Petitioners minimize reckless domestic violence
crimes as “accidental,” “minor” or “less serious,” Pet.
Br. at 24-25, 28, 32, and miss the essential defining
characteristic of abusers’ violence against their partners:
an intentional pattern of coercive control that constantly
exposes victims to danger. As this Court has recognized,
domestic violence is rarely a single incident, but is typified
by an ongoing pattern of abuse and a dynamic of power
and control.19 Leading researchers describe domestic
battering as “a course of calculated, malevolent conduct,
deployed almost exclusively by men to dominate individual
women, by interweaving repeated physical abuse with
three equally important tactics: intimidation, isolation and
19. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 889-93 (1992) (“Wife-battering or abuse can take on many
physical and psychological forms . . . it is common for the battering
husband to also abuse the children in an attempt to coerce the wife....
Many [women] may fear devastating forms of psychological abuse
from their husbands, including verbal harassment, threats of future
violence, the destruction of possessions, physical confinement to the
home, the withdrawal of financial support, or the disclosure of the
abortion to family and friends”). See also Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at
1411 (“‘Domestic violence’ is not merely a type of ‘violence’; it is a
term of art encompassing acts that one might not characterize as
‘violent’ in a nondomestic context. See Brief for National Network to
End Domestic Violence, et al. as Amici Curiae 4–9.”).
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control.”20 In most domestic violence, the “batterer’s quest
for control of the woman [lies] at the heart of the battering
process.”21 Guns are frequently used in furtherance of this
process. In a survey of 417 women in 67 battered women’s
shelters in California, for example, 65% of women who
lived in homes with guns before seeking shelter reported
that their abuser had used a gun to scare, threaten or
harm them. 22 See generally, Brief of Domestic Violence
Hotline, et al.
Thus, even when a particular charged crime involves
a mens rea of recklessness and an actus reus of offensive
contact, the individual crime charged is typically only one
part of a larger pattern of intentional, malevolent, and
purposeful conduct. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1412 (“the
accumulation of such [minor] acts over time can subject
one intimate partner to the other’s control”). It is therefore
not at all out of proportion for Congress to remove guns
from those convicted of misdemeanor crimes of domestic
violence with a recklessness mens rea.
20. Evan Stark, C oerci v e C ontrol : How M en E ntr ap
Women in Personal Life 5 (2007). See also Deborah Tuerkheimer,
Recognizing and Remedying the Harm of Battering: A Call to
Criminalize Domestic Violence, 94 Northwestern J. of Crim. Law
& Criminology 959, 962-963 (2003-2004) (“Outside the criminal law
context, domestic violence is widely understood as an ongoing pattern
of behavior defined by both physical and non-physical manifestations
of power. This is a remarkably uncontroversial proposition. For
women whose lives it describes, the oft-described ‘power and control’
dynamic is ubiquitous. . . .”).
21. Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women:
Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 5 (1991).
22. Susan B. Sorenson & Douglass J. Wiebe, Weapons in the
Lives of Battered Women. 94 A m. J. of Pub. Health 1412-17 (2004).
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2.

Seemingly minor acts can be injurious,
terrifying, and harbingers of homicide.

Moreover, even individual reckless acts that may
appear “minor” often entail risk of serious harm or
compound victims’ terror. For instance, Amici have
handled cases in which (i) an abuser recklessly hurled a
jar in the direction of his partner, missing her but almost
hitting her baby; (ii) the abuser angrily slammed the
door on his partner who was trying to leave, crushing her
fingers; and (iii) an abuser threw a plate of hot food at his
partner, leaving her uninjured but with food dripping from
her face and hair. Regardless of whether severe, minor,
or no injury results, such conduct displays a volatility that
terrorizes and controls the victim. This is so regardless
of whether the act itself was intended to injure the victim
or just to express the perpetrator’s rage – and regardless
of whether injury or only “offensive touching” results.
In short, criminalizing possession of firearms based on
“minor acts” such as this is not excessive in relation to
either the risks posed by the conduct or its over-arching
intent, regardless of whether the particular act was
intentionally or recklessly committed and of the severity
of the resulting contact.
Indeed, seemingly “minor” acts of domestic violence
are sometimes only minutes away from homicide. For
example, in Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 545
U.S. 748 (2005), the police ignored a mother’s repeated
pleas to arrest her estranged husband for violating
her protection order when he took the children without
permission; the father then murdered the children. Id.
at 751-754. See also Campbell v. Campbell, 682 A.2d
272, 273 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1996) (after police failed to arrest
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respondent who violated stay-away provision and merely
escorted him from the premises, he returned and shot
the victim); Mastroianni v. County of Suffolk, 91 N.Y.2d
198, 201-02 (N.Y. 1997) (victim stabbed to death after
police failed to arrest husband—despite knowing he was
visiting neighbors next door—after he violated order by
entering her home and removing her furniture). This
Court has recognized that even a minor domestic violence
misdemeanor conviction can be a red flag for potentially
lethal violence. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1408-09. See also
Jacquelyn C. Campbell, Danger Assessment, https://www.
dangerassessment.org/DA.aspx (empirically supported
instrument includes slapping, hitting, and minimally
violent behaviors, in assessing risks of lethality).
For all these reasons, a leading expert in domestic
violence and criminal justice states that “[o]ne of the most
crucial steps to prevent lethal violence is to disarm abusers
and keep them disarmed. . . [pursuant to] 18 U.S.C. Sec.
922(g)(9).” Andrew R. Klein, Practice Implications of
Current Domestic Violence Research, 37 (2008).
Petitioners’ attempt to cast doubt on the fact that
“[d]omestic violence often escalates in severity over
time,” as this Court recognized in Castleman, 134 S. Ct.
at 1408, must fail. See Pet. Br. at 28 n. 10 (“the available
data suggest that the notion that domestic disputes are
repeated and necessarily evolve into ongoing violence
. . . is inconclusive”) (emphasis added). Petitioners’ sole
support for this argument is a questionable interpretation
of a single study, which does not support their assertion.
23
Moreover, one need not meet Petitioners’ straw man
23. Petitioners cite for this proposition, Christopher D.
Maxwell, et al., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, The Effects of Arrest on
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of 100% consistency to know that as a general matter,
domestic violence does indeed almost always repeat,
and very often escalates. See e.g., Natalie Loder Clark,
Crime Begins at Home: Let’s Stop Punishing Victims and
Perpetuating Violence, 28 Wm. & M ary L. Rev. 263, 291
(1987). In fact, specialists in risk assessment agree that
both a history of misdemeanor-level violence and coercive
control are among the primary red flags for potential
homicide. See Gavin de Becker, The Gift of Fear 183
(1997) (cataloging, among other indicators of domestic
violence homicide risk, acts of coercive control such as
resolving conflict with intimidation, bullying and violence;
breaking or striking things in anger, and a history of
police encounters for behavioral offenses, such as threats,
stalking, assault and battery). 24

Intimate Partner Violence: New Evidence From the Spouse Assault
Replication Program, U.S. DOJ, Nat ’l Inst. of Just. 1-15 (2001).
Counter to their depiction, the Maxwell study found, among other
things, that “[a]rrest is associated with less repeat offending. . .” and
that reports from victims showed greater recidivism than arrest
rates alone. Id. at 2. Given the extremely short follow-up period of
six months, id. at 3, this study’s recidivism findings are of limited
significance for purposes of this case. See text, infra.

24. “Women’s risk of homicide (femicide) increased for women
who separated from their abusers after living together, particularly
when the abuser was highly controlling.” Connie J. A. Beck &
Chitra Raghavan, Intimate Partner Abuse Screening in Custody
Mediation: The Importance of Assessing Coercive Control, 48 Fam.
Ct. Rev. 556 (2010) (citing Jacquelyn C. Campbell, et al., Risk Factors
for Femicide in Abusive Relationships: Results From a Multisite
Case Control Study, 93 A m. J. of Public Health, 1089-1097 (2003));
Campbell, Assessing Risk Factors, supra, at 14-19.
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A comprehensive overview of empirical research
on domestic violence and recidivism confirms that most
individuals arrested for domestic violence have criminal
records (not necessarily for domestic violence crimes), 25
and that “a hard core of a third of abusers will re-abuse
in the short run and more will re-abuse in the longer
run.”26 Studies have found that the rate of re-abuse during
follow-up periods of four months to two years ranged
from 24% to 60%. 27 Moreover, “[r]e-abuse has been found
to be substantially higher in longer term studies.” 28 Two
found abuse re-arrest or protection order violation rates
of almost 60% over five and ten years. 29 Of particular
importance here, among the factors predictive of repeat
abuse and of lethality, a key factor is the presence of
firearms in the household. 30
25. Rodney K ingswor th, Intimate Par tner Violence:
Predictors of Recidivism in a Sample of Arrestees, 12 Violence
Against Women 917-935 (2006) (finding that an offender’s prior arrest
for any offense predicted re-arrest for intimate violence within an
18-month follow-up period).
26. Klein, Practical Implications, supra, at 26.
27. Id. at 26, n. 121.
28. Id. at 27.
29. Id. at 27 (citations omitted). Notably, the research also
confirms that re-arrest is not a complete measure of recidivism,
because so much ongoing abuse is either not reported or not subjected
to arrest. Richard B. Felson, Jeffrey M. Ackerman, & Catherine
Gallagher, Police Intervention and the Repeat of Domestic Assault,
U.S. DOJ, Nat ’l I nst. of Just. (2005)(finding that only half of
subsequent assaults were reported to police).
30. Campbell, et al., Risk Factors for Femicide, supra, at 1089,
1097; Campbell, Assessing Risk Factors, supra, at 14-19.
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In short, the evidence shows that domestic violence
incidents need not involve specific intent nor constitute
major violence in order to be predictive of future risk, and
that guns place victims of domestic violence at significantly
greater risk. Against this backdrop, the government’s
compelling interest in removing guns from those convicted
of misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence, whether
involving actual injury or offensive contact, cannot be
gainsaid.
IV. M A N DAT O RY A R R E S T A N D NO - D R O P
PROSECUTION POLICIES NEITHER REMOVE
DI S C R E T IO N NO R R E S U LT I N OV E R PROSECUTION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE.
Petitioners claim that, due to mandatory arrest laws
and no-drop prosecution policies, many undeserving
domestic violence misdemeanors are “swept” into the
criminal justice system. Pet. Br. at 10, 26, 27. They assert
that such policies mean that “police and prosecutors do
not have the discretion to forego arrest and prosecution
in cases where the conduct is minor or unclear.” Id. at 27
(citation omitted). This is entirely incorrect.
First, the purpose of mandatory arrest laws and nodrop prosecution policies is not to treat domestic violence
more seriously than other crimes; it is to correct for
past practices of refusing to treat domestic violence as
a crime at all. 31 Mandatory arrest laws and prosecution
31. Prior to the late 1980s, police often avoided responding
to domestic violence calls and refused to make arrests. See Chief
William L. Hart, et al., U.S. Attorney General’s Task Force on
Family Violence, Final Report 16-18 (1984), http://babel.hathitrust.
org/cgi/pt?id=umn.31951d00277593j;view=1up;seq=3; Joan Zorza,
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no-drop policies were correctives to widespread exercises
of discretion to refuse to arrest or prosecute for
domestic assaults. See Joan Zorza, The Criminal Law of
Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 46, 48 (1992) (describing
police departments with a “clear non-arrest policy”).
Petitioners greatly overstate the effect of these reform
policies, however. Mandatory arrest laws and no-drop
prosecution policies do not, and cannot, eliminate police
or prosecutor discretion. Mandatory arrest means only
that police may no longer refuse to arrest when there is
probable cause to believe a crime has been committed. See
Zorza, supra, at 63, 64. Police must still assess the facts
and determine if probable cause has been met; if it has,
under mandatory arrest laws they are simply required
to treat domestic violence no differently than any other
crime. See Town of Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 760 (“We do
not believe that these provisions of Colorado [mandatory
arrest] law truly made enforcement of restraining orders
mandatory. A well established tradition of police discretion
has long coexisted with apparently mandatory arrest
statutes”).
The Criminal Law of Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 1970-1990, 83
J. of Crim. L. & Criminology 16-18 (1992); Cheryl Hanna, No Right
to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Violence
Prosecutions, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1849, 1857 (1996). Studies conducted
in the 1980s and 1990s found that arrests occurred in only 3% to 14%
of all intimate partner cases to which officers actually responded. Eve
S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa, Introduction, in Domestic Violence:
The Changing Criminal Justice Response (1992) at vii, xvi. Similarly,
prosecutors historically resisted prosecuting abuse, downgraded
severe violence to misdemeanor charges, and dropped cases when
victims expressed any ambivalence. See Zorza, supra; U.S. Attorney
General’s Task Force Final Report (1984), supra.
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It is thus not surprising that, at best, mandatory
arrest laws have resulted in arrest rates of approximately
50%, 32 a figure that should be taken in the context of the
likelihood that official rates may not account for additional
cases that are screened out “based on departmental
priorities [even] before they are recorded as domestic
or an officer is dispatched.” 33 And despite the significant
and valuable changes that mandatory arrest has brought
to police practice, police response to domestic violence
continues, in some quarters, to be deeply inadequate.
See Barbara Hart, Policing Domestic Violence, 21
Nat ’l Bulletin on Domestic Violence Prevention, 1
(2015) (“Much has changed in 40 years. Much has not.”)
(describing two 2015 national surveys of domestic violence
victims that reported widespread police hostility toward
victims, refusal to believe reports of abuse, minimizing
the risks, and other biases).
Similarly, no-drop policies were adopted in many
prosecutors’ offices, not to prioritize domestic violence
prosecutions over other crimes, but rather to overcome
prosecutorial ambivalence and resistance to going forward
with these often difficult cases. 34 These policies are also
32. David Hirschel, Domestic Violence Cases: What Research
Shows About Arrest and Dual Arrest Rates (2008), retrieved at
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/222679.pdf. This report analyzed
data from the National Incident-Based Reporting System in multiple
jurisdictions in 2000. Among other things, it found that despite
mandatory arrest policies, dual arrest remains quite low (about
2%). Id. at § 1.
33. Stark, supra at 62 (describing this practice as a “problem
with accurately measuring attrition” [i.e., rates of police response]).
34. As one prosecutor stated: “When I look back at how it
used to be with battered women, I can see that it was a self-fulfilling
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necessary in order to remove the burden on victims of
“choosing” whether to go forward or not – a practice that
subjects victims to perpetrators’ coercion to drop or recant
the charges. See Hanna, supra.
In fact, the picture today is of prosecution policies
and practices that run the gamut across the country, from
minimal prosecution to quite effective no-drop policies.
A review of 120 studies from over 170 mostly urban
jurisdictions in 44 states and the District of Columbia
of intimate partner prosecutions between 1973 and 2006
found a range of prosecution rates from 4.6% of arrests in
Milwaukee in 1988-89 to 94% of arrests in Cincinnati, Ohio
in 1993-96. Klein, Practical Implications, supra, at 41.
Even at their most rigorous, no-drop policies do not
and cannot prevent prosecutors from (i) choosing not to
file charges in the first instance, and (ii) dismissing cases
when they deem the evidence insufficient to go forward. 35
prophesy. We’d file if she really wanted us to, but we knew that
she’d want us to drop charges later . . . we may have even told her
so. Then we sent her back home, often back to her abuser, without
any support or protection at all. Sure enough, she wouldn’t follow
through and we’d think, ‘It’s always the same with these cases.’”
Gail A. Goolkasian, Confronting Domestic Violence: A Guide for
Criminal Justice Agencies, Nat ’l Inst. of Just. 55 (1986).

35. Barbara E. Smith, Robert Davis, Laura B. Nickles &
Heather Davies, An Evaluation of Efforts to Implement No-Drop
Policies: Two Central Values in Conflict, Final Report vii (2001)
(“no-drop is more a philosophy than a strict policy of prosecuting
domestic violence cases. None of the prosecutors pursued every case
they filed. Prosecutors were rational decision-makers who were most
likely to proceed without the victim’s cooperation if they had a strong
case based on other evidence.”).
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Petitioners’ reliance on a Bureau of Justice Statistics
study to suggest domestic violence is being prosecuted
even more than other crimes overstates what the study
was able to examine. Pet. Br. at 27, citing Erica Smith, et
al., State Court Processing of Domestic Violence Cases,
DOJ, Bureau of Just. Stat. (2008) (“Smith”). That study
actually measured only prosecutions that moved forward
after cases were filed by prosecutors. Those cases which
prosecutors screened out and declined to charge altogether
“could not be included in the calculation of the prosecution
rate because that information was not collected in the
15-county study.” Smith, at 7. In fact, the follow up
report on the same data states that 21-49% of cases were
dismissed by prosecutors after initial charges were filed.
Erica L. Smith & Donald J. Farole, Profile of Intimate
Partner Violence Cases in Large Urban Counties, U.S.
DOJ, Bureau of Just. Stat. (2009) (Table 17).
The bottom line continues to be that only a fraction
of domestic violence incidents result in arrest, and
far fewer result in prosecution, let alone conviction. 36
Petitioners’ hyperbolic claims about mandatory arrest
laws and no-drop prosecution policies sweeping many
cases of questionable, minor or innocent conduct into the
criminal justice system, let alone going to conviction, are
thus demonstrably false. Therefore, Petitioners’ claim
that applying the Lautenberg Amendment to reckless
batteries will deprive many innocent or fundamentally
benign individuals of their guns is, quite simply, fiction.
See Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1412 (“If a seemingly minor
act like this draws the attention of authorities and leads
36. Stark, supra at 62-63; Smith & Farole, supra (percentages
of filed charges that went to conviction ranged from 17% to 89%
across 16 jurisdictions).
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to a successful prosecution for a misdemeanor offense, it
does not offend common sense or the English language to
characterize the resulting conviction as a ‘misdemeanor
crime of domestic violence’”).
CONCLUSION
For all of the reasons described in this brief, Amici
respectfully submit that this Court should affirm the decision
of the First Circuit upholding Petitioners’ convictions on
the grounds that the Lautenberg Amendment’s definition
of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence includes
convictions for reckless battery.
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